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U.S. SPEAKER
Kevin Broscht
Thanks very much, Brad. Good afternoon, and I want to thank Professor
King and Professor Picker and the conference committee for inviting me here
this year. I love to come to Cleveland and to Case Western Reserve. You
have a beautiful law school here. It is quite an honor to be here. I also want to
thank Dick Cunningham who had some hand in getting me to come and
speak this year.
You know, Ted Kassinger said when he decided to go to the State De-
partment, he called Dick. And Dick said it was a no-brainer, an easy choice
to go work at State rather than Steptoe & Johnson. Well, that was absolutely
untrue. Dick is a liar. The greatest opportunity for a young lawyer interested
in trade law in Washington over the last 25 years has been to work for Dick
Cunningham at Steptoe & Johnson, I can tell you that. I did it myself. It was
a great experience.
When I went to Steptoe, which is about the time Ted Kassinger passed up
the opportunity, the associates that sat down the hall from me who also
worked for Dick Cunningham included Charlene Barshevsky, and Susan
Esserman. Gary Horlick, Alan Holmer, Judy Bellow and Olin Wethington.
Bob Novick later joined us.
During the last 15 years, these people who worked for Dick Cunningham
have served as the U.S. Trade Representative, three Deputy U.S. Trade Rep-
resentatives, ambassador status, five USTR General Counsel, three Assistant
Secretaries of Commerce, a Department of Commerce General Counsel, an
Assistant Secretary of Treasury, and a Special White House Advisor. So if
you don't think it is an opportunity to work for Dick, think about that.
t Kevin Brosch is DTB's attorney partner, specializing in international and agricultural
policy and law. He has served as special advisor on international trade to the Senate Agricul-
ture Committee and as chief international trade attorney in USDA's Office of the General
Counsel. Mr. Brosch also practiced international trade and antitrust law with the Washington
firm of Steptoe & Johnson where he represented clients in the agricultural, electrical, elec-
tronic, computer and telephone industries. He is widely recognized as the foremost expert in
agricultural trade law and acts as outside counsel for DTB clients. Mr. Brosch is frequently
asked to advise clients on domestic farm and trade-related legislation and their compatibility
with international trade laws and rules.
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I congratulate this institute for having Dick Cunningham as a member of
their board of advisers. I consider Dick to be the outstanding Washington
trade lawyer in the last 25 years.
(Applause.)
You will notice Dick's face is as red as his sweater, and that's why he
wore the sweater.
You know, someone out in the audience today during lunch told me that
we haven't had a joke today, and that we really need a joke to get this session
going, and so I volunteer this one.
This story was told to me recently. I was, during my time in government,
a trade negotiator, both during the Uruguay round and NAFTA, so I think I
have some license to tell this story. I didn't make up the joke.
There are three NAFTA negotiators. They are working in agriculture, and
during the break in negotiations, the three are sitting around talking.
And the Canadian says, "You know, we in the Canadian Government, we
have to be bilingual. Everyone has to speak English and French, or you can't
get the job, so we are all bilingual." The Mexican says, "Eell we are bilin-
gual, too. Even though Spanish is the national language of Mexico, we all
have to speak English because of these negotiations are conducted in Eng-
lish. So we are all bilingual, too."
The American is kind of sitting back there looking a little lost, and he fi-
nally says, "Well, we are bilingual, too. We can speak out of both sides of
our mouth."
(Laughter.)
I didn't make that joke up. It was told to me, but I ought to pass it around
because I think to some extent - and I say this with some chagrin - since
1998, that is the case with American trade policy and agriculture. I hope that
some time soon we are able to do something about that.
I was asked to talk about what was the American approach to agricultural
trade, and I suppose that means what is U.S. agricultural trade policy. And in
my view, we had an agricultural trade policy. We had a good one; we had a
strong one between 1981 and 1996,1 but since 1998, the situation in terms of
our trade policy in the United States has been one - I think Dick described it
earlier - of entropy. That is, a state of organization dwindling into something
of disorganization over the past six years. I'd like to start with two observa-
1 See Stacey Willemsen Person, International Trade: Pushing United States Agriculture
Toward a Greener Future?, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 307, 313-16 (2005) (Discussing the
evolution of U.S. agricultural policy); See also generally Terrence J. Sorg, Global Hunger, a
Doubling Population, and Environmental Degradation: Justifying Radical Changes in U.S.
Farm Policy, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 679, 698-702 (1996) (describing the history of
U.S. agricultural trade policy).
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tions about trade law in the United States in general and also then about the
nature of agricultural policy and how it is made in the United States.
I think it was eluded earlier, but not described specifically, that we don't
really have trade treaties in the United States. You know, NAFTA is not a
"treaty" if you live on this side of the border, and neither are the WTO or the
CAFTA.
I have heard a lot of people from other countries say, "well, we have this
treaty with you Americans." Well, they really don't from the U.S. legal per-
spective because all lawyers - I imagine most of the people in this room are
lawyers - know that in the United States, for something to be a treaty, you
have to go through a certain constitutional process. You have to have the
President negotiate it, bring it back, present it to the Senate of the United
States for its advice and consent and have that voted on and approved by
two-thirds majority of the senators present.2
We haven't had a trade treaty ever, or at least since World War II, go
through that process. 3 As many of you who watch the constitutional process
understand, the United States Congress does not approve many treaties. The
Senate is not very fond of treaties - indeed, they rarely ratify treaties any
more.
Very often, even the ones that aren't very controversial - like the Law of
the Sea Treaty,4 for example, that is supported by both the left and the right
in the U.S. political spectrum - right now is having trouble getting through
the Senate. Congress just doesn't like treaties. Having worked in Congress, I
can tell you why. It is because they don't write these agreements. And Con-
gress does not like to pass things that they didn't write.
In fact, one of the little known facts is that the WTO was, in fact, pre-
sented as a treaty for ratification when it was first brought back from Geneva
in 1947. 5 It lingered in the United States Senate, I think, until 19546 when the
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3 See Steve Charnovitz, Using Framework Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Making, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 699-704 (2004) (discussing "[t]he tradition in U.S. trade policy of cir-
cumventing the Senate treaty process..."); see also Connie de la Vega, Human Rights and
Trade: Inconsistent Application of the Treaty Law in the United States, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 7-8 (2004) (reviewing the debate of the constitutionality of congressional-
executive agreements) [hereinafter Human Rights and Trade]; see also generally Frederick M.
Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
900, 930-31 & n.63 (1996-97) (describing the fast-track legislative process for trade treaties).
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
5 See George E.C. York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal
Architecture of International Agricultural Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 455 (2001) (refer-
ring to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Trade Organization);
see also generally Understanding the WTO - The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/fact4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
See Ronald A Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
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administration back then finally gave up and said we are just not going to be
able to get ratification. We have to operate in a different way with respect to
trade agreements.
And one of the reasons that Congress doesn't like to do this is because the
constitution sort of squints on this notion of who is in charge in this area. The
President certainly has this Article II power to negotiate treaties 7 but Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution says that Congress has the authority to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations,8 and Congress also has the exclusive
authority under that same section to impose taxes, including tariffs.9
So it seems under that section of the Constitution, Congress is in charge,
and this whole idea that the President should somehow step up and usurp that
- that general regulatory authority that Congress has - by occasionally bring-
ing home a treaty and saying here, pass this - Congress doesn't like that idea,
and they say, in effect, "No. We don't think so. What we think what you
ought to do is to propose implementing legislation.
And so that's what we have gotten to in the United States. We have now
what we call in the United States executive agreements. 10 We don't have
treaties in trade. We have executive agreements, and the President comes
home with what he has negotiated after seven or eight years, for example, the
Uruguay Round agreements. But those agreements are not submitted as trea-
ties and therefore never become law in the United States.
You know, if it were a treaty and ratified by the Senate, the words of the
treaty itself would be law in the United States just as though it were a stat-
ute. 1' It would have the same status as a statute, but we don't have that. The
treaty sort of sits on the side, and what the Congress of the United States
does, in collaboration with the Administration, is to put together an imple-
menting bill. When that bill is ultimately enacted by Congress, it supposedly
approximates the treaty into our national law.
And believe me, there is oftentimes a slip between the cup and the lip dur-
ing that implementing bill process. So this is the first thing that you have to
understand when you wonder why it is that our political leaders - and espe-
cially our representatives in Congress - are not that observant of what most
people consider to be our international obligations contained in trade treaties.
From the perspective of manyU.S. politician, and many in the U.S. legisla-
ture, the trade treaty in question is simple not U.S. law. It is what the Presi-
United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 482 (1990) (discussing the Truman
administrations decision "to withdraw its request for Senate consent to the ITO Charter.").
7 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10 Human Rights and Trade, supra note 3.
1 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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dent has negotiated, but not the law. What becomes law in the United States
and what we are bound to from the legislative point of view is what Congress
essentially passes and implements.
The second thing you need to recall is that agriculture is a particularly fa-
vored child of the legislature. Agricultural politics in the United States are
not partisan. We don't have a situation where the Republicans are in favor of
farmers and the Democrats are against farmers or visa versa. Both parties
support agriculture.
All agricultural politics in the United States are regional. Republicans and
Democrats elected from districts next door to one another tend to see agricul-
tural politics in the same light. For example, Larry Combest, who was the
Chairman of the House Agriculture and one of the two major authors of the
2002 farm bill,12 cooperated on that legislation closely with Charlie Sten-
holm, who was the ranking Democrat on the House Agricultural Committee
and also happened to be from the adjoining district in north Texas. Both of
them were from huge cotton districts.
However else they saw other issues of politics, they viewed agriculture in
just the same way, which is: we got to get the most we can for the cotton
farmers, and we have got to do whatever else we can to arrange this. So agri-
culture is not a partisan political issue in the United States, it is regional. And
it is part of the politics in the United States that the President generally stays
away from.
The President doesn't see any political benefit from getting involved on
one side of an issue or another because he is going to anger one part of his
own party or the other depending on what region those things favor. So poli-
tics are not partisan in the United States, and the President stays out. Con-
gress really is in charge.
Put those two things together, you will understand why it is often said in
the United States that the farm bill will not be written in Geneva. That's a
phrase that you hear often in the United States. People say, well, you can go
out and negotiate and talk about what our trade agreements are, but don't
come back to the United States and tell us how to write the farm bill because
that is something that is solely within the purview of Congress and is very
dear to our hearts.
The United States never really had a trade policy in agriculture.' 3 We had
an agricultural policy that started essentially in the New Deal and extended
12 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, and 21 U.S.C.).
13 See Jimmye S. Hillman, Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: A United States Perspec-
tive, 28 TULSA L.J. 761, 761-62 (1993) (discussing inconsistencies in U.S. agricultural and
trade policies).
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all the way until 1970 virtually unchanged. 14 Basically, we were in there to
support farmers and to essentially moderate the swings in farm prices, to
keep production on kind of an even keel.
We were not a big agricultural exporter during that time.15 Farming was
highly regulated, and despite its many, many problems, essentially farming
was an internal domestic and oriented process with the exception perhaps of
PL 480, a donation program, but it was really kind of exceptional until about
1971. However, there arose a belief in the late '60s and early '70s that we
were going to need greater production in the United States because there was
a Malthusian nightmare in Asia about to happen. 16 The population was going
to outstrip people's ability, and we had not only the duty, but a great oppor-
tunity to become this great residual supplier of grain and other food stuffs to
Asia. -When this began, there was sort of a unspoken alliance of interests
between the people who were interested in the eleemosynary aspect of this
and the people who were looking for additional farm income. That marriage
of interests resulted in the farm bill of 197 1,'7 which, for the first time, raised
support prices or target prices for the major crops to very high levels, higher
than they had ever been before' 8 - the idea being they provide additional
incentives for farmers to produce in the United States.
And between 1970 and 1981, we added 60 million acres to production in
the United States, 19 the first time that the United States really became a ma-
14 Id. at 762 (arguing that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of June 1934 was enacted
to "reverse isolationism and fair trade policies...").
15 See Carrol Whitton, Value of US. Agricultural Trade by Fiscal Year, 1935-Present,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV. (2003), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FATUS/DATA/XMS1935fy.xls (indicating by statistical data
that the total value of U.S. agricultural exports went from $0.67 billion in 1935 to $6.96 billion
in 1970, compared with $56.19 billion in 2003).
16 See Allen H. Olson, Federal Farm Programs - Past, Present and Future - Will We
Learn from our Mistakes?, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 13 (2001) (citing high
world demand for U.S. agricultural products in the early 1970s and famine in Asia); see also
Lorretta F. Smith, The GA TT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 919, 986-87 (1991)
(discussing the efforts of the U.S. government to make farms more productive); see also gen-
erally Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035, 1043 (1996) (discussing
Paul Ehrlich's THE POPULATION BOMB); see also Andrew D. Ringel, The Population Policy
Debate and the World Bank: Limits to Growth vs. Supply-side Demographics, 6 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1993) (discussing the media attention given to Paul Ehrlich's
Malthusian predictions).
17 Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2279cc (1971).
18 See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT
and Global Free Trade, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1165, 1185 (1993) (discussing the concept of a
target price) [hereinafter Agricultural Trade Wars].
19 Historical Track Records: April 2003, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., 5
(2003), available at http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/data-sets/crops/96120/trackrec2003.pdf.
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jor, major exporter of agricultural products.20 And that worked very well
between 1970 and 1981. We added a lot of production. That production was
eaten up in Asia by the expansion of the middle class in the Asian miracle
during that decade, and then after 1981, when there was a downturn in Asia,
it all crashed.2'
There was not just the U.S. production, but similar kinds of incentives
were being put into the systems in Japan and Europe.22 Other countries were
coming on as producers, and all of a sudden in the early '80s, we had this
tremendous crop surplus that nobody had predicted, and we had declining
prices all around the world, and we had a huge jump in the U.S. budget.23
The budget between 1981 and 1984 went from $3 billion dollars to $27 bil-
24lion dollars for agriculture, and the Reagan administration who was hit with
this crisis concluded that there had to be a better way.
Beginning with President Reagan's Administration and through the first
year of President George W. Bush's Administration - from 1981 through
1997 - we had a fairly consistent agricultural and trade policy, which was
that we were trying to find a way to get these incentives back out of the agri-
culture system. That was going to be difficult, because farmers have gotten
used to receiving payments, and their Congressmen like the idea that the fed-
eral government was going to support farming. We had to find a way out of
that.
And the most obvious way out was to convince everybody that it is both
good for us in the United States, and good for rest of the world also that we
go back to a market-based agricultural system. Of course, we needed to other
countries to do so too.
So in the 1983,-84 period, the United States began to try to talk to other
countries about a multilateral negotiation that would create rules for agricul-
tural trade and that would get rid of farm subsidies. 25 It was assumed in the
20 See Caroly Dimitri, Anne Effland & Neilson Conklin, The 2 0th Century Transformation
of US. Agriculture and Farm Policy, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. ECON. INFO. BULL.
3, 8 (June 2005), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB3/EIB3.pdf.
21 See Patrick W. Fischer, Sweat Equity: In re Ahlers, 23 TULSA L.J. 37, 37 n.5 (1987)
(discussing the farm crisis).
22 See Agricultural Trade Wars, supra note 18, at 1179-84.
23 See Bethany Verhoef Brands, Thomas M. Johnston & Jill Korenevich Harker, The Iowa
Mediation Service: An Empirical Study of Iowa Attorney's Views on Mandatory Farm Media-
tion, 79 IOWA L. REv. 653, 661-62 (1994) (arguing that "a number of relevant events triggered
drastic changes in the economic climate for agriculture.").
24 See Office of Management and Budget: Public Budget Database, (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/sheets/budauth.xls (providing raw budget
data).
25 See Alice M. Rivlin, Agricultural Export Markets and the Potential Effects of Export
Subsidies 1-3, Cong. Budget Off. (June 1983), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/flpdocs/50xx/doc5O24/docO3-Entire.pdf (scrutinizing farm subsidies).
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Reagan Administration that we would be able to convince our farmers to
accept liberalization if we could show them that other farmers in the world
would no longer be subsidized and that other countries would open their
markets to U.S. exports.
So the trade liberalization through the multilateral process was a key
component of reforming U.S. agriculture policy as well. And at first this
went pretty well. In '85, we passed a new farm bill.26 We made some im-
provements domestically; couldn't make too many, but as the trade rounds
started to move and things started getting more positive, we made better im-
provements in 1990. And by the time the Uruguay round got passed and we
did have some disciplines finally for agricultural trade in the world, the U.S.
Congress was ready in 1996 to pass what was really a revolutionary farm
bill, the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996,27 which for the first time gave farmers
payments on what we call a "decoupled" basis.28
In other words, Freedom to Farm created a mechanism to continue to pro-
vide farmers with income support, but not on the basis of their current pro-
duction; we were just going to say we are going to give you a payment just
based on the fact that you were a farmer, and we are going to do this based
on what you did in the past, not based on current production.29 And the idea
that the bill's authors had was that over seven years, to the levels of payment
would decline until the Government finally got out of the production subsidy
business altogether. 30 That proved to be a bit idealistic.
I would say 1996 was the high mark of our agricultural policy. Really
there was a coordination between what we were trying to do internationally
and what we were trying to do on the domestic front. And we needed that
international aspect of it because in the United States no politician in the
United States or Congress that would have been willing to do this without the
idea that the farmers could turn from the Government to the market in a
26 Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678, (1985) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
27 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR), Pub. L. No. 104-
127, 110 Stat. 888, (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 20, and 21
U.S.C.).
28 See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping
Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 237-238 (1993) (defining recoupled basis and con-
trasting it with a decoupled basis) [hereinafter Feeding Our Future]; see also Giancarlo
Moschini & Paolo Sckokai, Efficiency of Decoupled Farm Programs Under Distortionary
Taxation, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 362, 362 (Aug. 1994) for a discussion of decoupling and lump-
sum taxation, available at http://chla.library.comel.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?sid=d86cb205283e30bOafc062d97e3fa5e2&idno=5032826 76_003&c=chla&cc=chla&se
q=21 &view-pdf.
29 See Feeding Our Future, supra note 28, at 238.
30 See Jon Lauck, After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of
"Freedom to Farm, " 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 3, 23 (2000).
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fairly effective way, and there would be open markets in the rest of the
world.
The problem was that prices collapsed in 1998.31 Late '97, and through
early '98, farm commodity prices declined precipitously, 32 and by that time,
the Regan Administration was out. The Clinton Administration was in, and
we had a mid-term election coming up.
And I don't think there was anybody in the Clinton Administration who
ever really understood what had been going on for the last 15 years and what
this was all about. They saw it very much in terms of partisan politics, the
opportunity to go out there and to tell farmers that this Administration was
willing to do for them whatever they wanted to do, and there became a great
bidding war.
I was working for Senator Lugar at that time. I don't think Senator Lugar
could believe what was happening, but in fact, there was an all-out bidding
war between the two parties to curry favor with the farm belt, and Congress
essentially reversed track. And in the first year, Congress voted emergency
payments of $4 and-a-half billion dollars and the next year emergency pay-
ments of about $8 billion dollars.33
Now, in 1998 when Congress voted farmers so-called "emergency pay-
ments" of $4.5 billion dollars, had they not given farmers a penny, the agri-
cultural sector still would have had above average net farm income for that
year.34 And when they voted them the $4.5 billion dollars additional money,
we had the second highest farm income year in American history.35
That was the "emergency" that was out there. It was a totally political
situation, and it really had to do very much with the fact that the Republican
Administration that had started this process of agricultural liberalization had
left office, and the Democratic Administration that replaced it really had very
little interest in pursuing that policy.
In 2000, we had in the Republicans return to the White House, but things
have not particularly improved. I was very surprised because there were high
hopes when Ambassador Zoellick came in. I was part of the transition team
for the Bush Administration. I will tell you what it is like to be part of a tran-
sition team if anybody has never done that before.
31 C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, Global Commodity Prices: High Volatility, Low
Income, MACROSCAN, Apr. 18, 2000, available at
htt2://www.macroscan.com/the/trade/apr00/print/prnt 180400GlobalCommPrices.htm.
33 Legislation Boosts Farm Assistance to Highest Level Since 1993, RURAL CONDITIONS
AND TRENDS, Vol. 10 issue 1, at 40.
34 Id
35 News Release, Iowa State University Extension, Government Support Helps Iowa Farm
Businesses Maintain Net Worth (Nov. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/newsrelU2001/nov01/nov0107.html.
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The first stage is what I would call the flattering approach stage. You get
a wonderful letter that tells what a great expert you are and how they need
you, and they are going to really depend upon you to set policy. The second
stage is about two weeks later when you get a flurry of requests to write pa-
pers.: "Please, no more than a page long, but please, we need a paper on this,
and that, and the other..." During that stage, you write 15, 20 of those in two
or three weeks. The third stage is when they totally ignore everything you
have written and sent to them. And the fourth stage is when you get a plaque
from the President himself thanking you for your valuable service.
(Laughter.)
And that's - that was my experience. I have got only one minute. That
was my experience during that time.
My advice to get back into a serious liberalization process through the
WTO. To do that, we needed to work on the next farm bill to realign our
policy, our agricultural policy with our trade policy, and I said the one thing
that we don't want to do really, the one thing that we can't afford to do is get
involved in too many of these free trade agreements.
Any more free trade agreements are not going to work, and if I had more
time, I could expound on why that is, but let me just tell you, we heard a lot
about free trade agreements this morning.
From an agricultural perspective in the United States, multiple free trade
agreements do not work in my view. And if anyone wants to talk about that
later, I would be glad to get into that discussion. We had, unfortunately, the
2002 farm bill where the President was a minority president. He didn't - he
didn't have time to worry about this, and so he basically sat on the sidelines
and let Congress write the farm bill, and with a huge budget surplus at that
time and fear that surplus was going to go away, the agriculture committee
rewrote a farm bill that just was a block-buster problem for the rest of the
world.36
If anybody wonders about how far off course agricultural policy has gone
in the United States, all you have to do is read the WTO decision in the Bra-
zil challenge to our U.S. cotton programs.37 The cotton case essentially tells
you in a very long difficult way what I am telling you in a short way - which
is the drift between U.S. domestic policy and U.S. agricultural trade policy
has widened substantially to a point that it is no longer the same policy at all.
I know this is all sort of a downer. But I would just suggest this one thing,
which is there has been a lot of discussion earlier today about U.S.-Canada
bilateral relations in the NAFTA. You notice that almost all the disputes have
36 Farm Security And Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, and 21 U.S.C.).
37 Appellate Body Report, United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R
(Mar. 3, 2005).
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to do with either lumber or agriculture. When people talked this morning,
they talked about wheat. They talked about lumber. They talked about pork,
dairy, eggs, poultry, and I could add beef and potatoes.
I didn't hear much discussion that was anything outside that context. I'd
suggest to you we don't really have a NAFTA problem between the United
States and Canada. We have an agriculture policy problem between the
United States and Canada, and if that were worked on, I think we would be
bragging about NAFTA rather than wringing our hands about it.
Thank you very much.
MR. SMITH: Thank you very much, Kevin. We are going to have Jim
McLandress speak to you. He has got his papers there for distribution. If you
haven't got a copy, you can get one after. The two of us are going to move
off and let him do his thing.
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